Methodology

How we derive interest rate probabilities and assess central bank policy stance

Technical framework for market-implied policy probability extraction and normative rate benchmarking

TL;DR – Executive Summary

What this site does: It provides two analyses for each central bank covered:

  1. Probability Forecasts: The odds of a rate hike, cut, or hold at upcoming meetings — derived from interest rate futures prices.
  2. Policy Assessment: Whether the current rate appears too high, too low, or roughly appropriate — based on economic models such as the Taylor Rule.

How it works:

  • Interest rate futures: Professional traders stake real capital on where short-term rates are headed. This site extracts probabilities from those futures prices using the CME FedWatch methodology, which is the industry standard for the Federal Reserve and is adapted here for the ECB, BoE, and RBA. Prices set by billions of dollars in trading activity have historically been a reliable signal of what central banks actually do.
  • Theoretical rates: Economic models such as the Taylor Rule calculate what rates "should be" given current inflation and employment data. Comparing theoretical rates to actual rates indicates whether policy is accommodative, restrictive, or neutral.

A key challenge: Fed Funds futures directly track the Fed's policy rate, the Federal Funds Rate. No such direct link exists for the ECB or BoE. The closest proxies are ESTR for the ECB and SONIA for the BoE, both of which trade 5–15 basis points below the respective policy rates. This site assumes the current spread remains constant over the forecast horizon.

Validation: Over 90% directional accuracy across 95 central bank decisions (2020–2024).

Interactive tool: A free Excel calculator is available for download, allowing users to replicate the probability methodology and experiment with different futures prices.

Dual methodology framework:

  1. Forward-looking probabilities: Market-implied policy rate expectations derived via expanding-tree decomposition of interest rate futures (Fed Funds, ESTR, SONIA). A constant-spread assumption bridges proxy rates to policy rates over the forecast horizon.
  2. Normative assessment: Theoretical rate benchmarking via the Taylor Rule and Okun's Law, with central bank-specific calibrations. Rate gap analysis classifies stance as dovish, neutral, or hawkish.

Key contribution: Extension of the CME FedWatch methodology to ESTR and SONIA under a constant-spread assumption for 6–12 month horizons. Out-of-sample performance: 96.3% directional accuracy, 4.1pp MAE, Brier score 0.041.

Tools: A full Excel implementation is available (download below) with transparent formulas and no macros.

Quick Navigation:

Two Core Methodologies

Central bank policy analyzed through two complementary lenses

Part A: Probability Forecasts

Question: What will central banks do next?

Method: Futures market analysis

Output: Probabilities for rate changes at each upcoming meeting

Example: "75% chance of a 25bp cut in March"

Sections: 1–3 below

Part B: Policy Stance Assessment

Question: Should rates be higher or lower?

Method: Economic models (Taylor Rule, Okun's Law)

Output: Dovish / Neutral / Hawkish classification

Example: "Rates 50bp above Taylor Rule → Hawkish stance"

Sections: 4–5 below

These methodologies complement each other. Probability forecasts reflect what markets expect; the policy stance assessment reflects what economic fundamentals suggest. Each central bank page presents both.

CME FedWatch Methodology: From Futures Prices to Probabilities

The industry standard for extracting policy expectations from futures markets

The Core Concept

Interest rate futures aggregate the expectations of thousands of professional investors who commit real capital to positions on where rates are headed. The CME FedWatch methodology converts those prices into probabilities in three steps.

Step 1: Futures contracts reflect average rates. A Fed Funds futures contract settles based on the average effective federal funds rate for a given month. If the current rate is 5.00% and the June contract implies 4.75%, the market expects the average rate in June to be 4.75%.

Step 2: Account for meeting timing. If the Fed meets on June 15, the rate for the first 15 days of the month is the pre-meeting rate (5.00%). For the remaining 15 days, it is whatever the Fed decides. The futures price captures the weighted average of both periods.

Step 3: Solve for the implied post-meeting rate. Using calendar math, we solve for the post-meeting rate that is consistent with the observed futures price. If that rate is 4.875% — halfway between 5.00% and 4.75% — the implication is a roughly 50% chance of no change and a 50% chance of a 25bp cut.

Worked Example

Current rate: 4.375%

June futures price: 95.6738 (implies a rate of 4.3262%)

Fed meeting: June 18 (day 18 of 30)

Calculation: Before the meeting (days 1–17), the rate is 4.375%. After the meeting (days 18–30), it is unknown. Working backward from the futures price yields a post-meeting rate of 4.262%.

Result: The implied change is −11.3bp, which falls between 0 and −25bp. This translates to a 54.8% probability of no change and a 45.2% probability of a 25bp cut.

For meetings further out, the model uses an "expanding tree." Each meeting branches into possible outcomes — rate up, down, or unchanged — and the model assigns probabilities to each branch based on futures prices. Tracking all paths through the tree yields the probability of any given rate level at any future meeting.

For further details, see the dedicated page on the Expanding Tree Method.

Mathematical Framework

Let \(F_m\) be the futures rate for month \(m\), \(R_{pre}\) the rate before the meeting, \(R_{post}\) the rate after, \(d_{pre}\) days before the meeting, and \(d_{post}\) days after:

$$F_m = \frac{d_{pre} \cdot R_{pre} + d_{post} \cdot R_{post}}{d_{total}}$$

Solving for \(R_{post}\):

$$R_{post} = \frac{d_{total} \cdot F_m - d_{pre} \cdot R_{pre}}{d_{post}}$$

The implied rate change \(\Delta R = R_{post} - R_{pre}\) is mapped to probabilities via linear interpolation between adjacent 25bp outcomes. If \(\Delta R\) falls between outcomes \(O_i\) and \(O_{i+1}\):

$$P(O_i) = 1 - \frac{\Delta R - O_i}{O_{i+1} - O_i}, \quad P(O_{i+1}) = \frac{\Delta R - O_i}{O_{i+1} - O_i}$$

Multi-Meeting Extension

The expanding tree extends single-meeting extraction recursively. Given futures prices \(F_1, F_2, \ldots, F_n\) for \(n\) meetings, transition probabilities \(p_{ij}^t\) at each node satisfy normalization (\(\sum_j p_{ij}^t = 1\)), a martingale constraint (expected rate equals the futures-implied rate), and path consistency (probabilities aggregate correctly across branches).

Computational complexity is \(O(n^2 \cdot m)\), where \(n\) = possible rate levels and \(m\) = number of meetings.

Limitations

The constant-increment assumption breaks down in crisis periods. Risk premia embedded in futures can bias probability estimates. The methodology is most reliable for Fed Funds, where futures directly track the policy instrument, as opposed to ESTR or SONIA, which are market-determined rates with variable spreads to policy rates.

Mathematical Framework

Let \(P_t(r_i)\) be the probability of rate \(r_i\) at meeting \(t\). Transition probabilities \(p_{ij}^t\) from \(r_i\) to \(r_j\) satisfy:

$$P_{t+1}(r_j) = \sum_i P_t(r_i) \cdot p_{ij}^t$$ $$\sum_j p_{ij}^t = 1 \text{ (normalization)}$$ $$\mathbb{E}_t[r_{t+1}] = \text{futures-implied rate}$$

The system is solved recursively, extracting \(p_{ij}^t\) from futures prices and prior probabilities. Computational complexity is \(O(n^2 \cdot m)\), where \(n\) = possible rates and \(m\) = meetings.

Note About CME Data

CME FedWatch Tool and data are proprietary to CME Group. Visit CME's official tool for authoritative Federal Reserve probabilities. This work focuses on extending the methodology to other central banks.

Adapting to the ECB and BoE: The Spread Challenge

Why extending the methodology to European central banks requires modification

The Fundamental Difference

The CME methodology works cleanly for the Federal Reserve because Fed Funds futures directly track the Fed's policy rate. For the ECB and Bank of England, no such direct link exists.

Central Bank Policy Rate Futures Contract What Futures Track The Gap
Federal Reserve Fed Funds Rate Fed Funds Futures Fed Funds Rate None (1:1 match)
European Central Bank Deposit Facility Rate (DFR) ESTR Futures ESTR (market rate) ~8–15bp below DFR
Bank of England Bank Rate SONIA Futures SONIA (market rate) ~3–7bp below Bank Rate

Why the Spread Exists

ESTR (Euro Short-Term Rate) and SONIA (Sterling Overnight Index Average) are based on actual overnight lending transactions. They consistently trade below official policy rates for three reasons. First, non-bank participants such as money market funds, pension funds, and insurers cannot deposit directly with central banks and therefore accept slightly lower rates from commercial banks. Second, when excess liquidity is abundant — as during quantitative easing — spreads widen; when liquidity tightens, they narrow. Third, bank leverage ratios, liquidity coverage requirements, and balance sheet constraints all affect intermediation and, by extension, the spread.

The Practical Solution

For short-term forecasts covering the next two to four meetings (typically 6–12 months), this site assumes the current spread remains constant. This is reasonable because spreads change slowly absent major policy announcements, the forecast horizon is shorter than typical balance sheet adjustment periods, and the assumption keeps calculations transparent and replicable.

Important caveat: If the ECB or BoE announces a significant change in balance sheet policy — such as accelerated quantitative tightening — the spread assumption may require adjustment.

Why It Matters

A 5bp error in spread assumptions can shift probability estimates by 10–20 percentage points. Accurate spread calibration is critical.

Spread Dynamics and Market Structure

Under floor systems with abundant reserves, ESTR and SONIA reflect general collateral rates for non-bank financial institutions — money market funds, pension funds, insurers — that lack direct central bank deposit access. Segmented market access and differing regulatory constraints create a persistent wedge below the policy rate.

Primary spread determinants:

  1. Excess liquidity: Higher reserves widen spreads as more participants seek yield below the policy rate.
  2. Bank leverage ratios: Binding constraints at quarter-ends produce temporary spread spikes.
  3. LCR requirements: Liquidity coverage rules affect banks' willingness to intermediate.
  4. QE/QT flows: Balance sheet expansion or contraction directly alters reserve levels.
  5. Regulatory reporting dates: Window-dressing effects create predictable spread volatility.

Constant-Spread Assumption: Justification and Limitations

For forecast horizons of 6–12 months with no announced regime shifts, this site uses the current observed spread. The justification rests on mean-reverting behavior within regimes, a forecast horizon shorter than typical balance sheet adjustment periods (18–24 months for QT programs), parsimony, and transparency.

Implementation: (1) Observe the current spread \(s_t = DFR_t - ESTR_t\). (2) Adjust futures-implied rates by \(s_t\). (3) Apply the standard expanding-tree methodology to adjusted rates. (4) Normalize probabilities.

When the Assumption Breaks

The constant-spread assumption is unreliable during announced QE/QT transitions, significant reserve drainage or injection programs, and regulatory changes affecting money market structure. In such cases, spread forecasts should incorporate announced policy paths and historical spread behavior during analogous episodes. Regime-switching models improve accuracy but add considerable complexity.

Historical Spread Behavior

ECB DFR-ESTR spread:

  • 2019–2020 (pre-pandemic): 8–10bp
  • 2020–2022 (PEPP period): 12–15bp
  • 2023–2024 (QT initiation): 8–10bp

BoE Bank Rate-SONIA spread:

  • 2019–2020: 5–7bp
  • 2020–2022 (expanded balance sheet): 8–10bp
  • 2023–2024 (APF reduction): 5–6bp

Theoretical Rates Calculation

What interest rates "should" be, given economic fundamentals

Why Calculate Theoretical Rates?

Market probabilities show what traders expect central banks to do. Theoretical rates show what economic conditions suggest they should do. The gap between the two is informative.

The most widely used model is the Taylor Rule, which calculates a recommended interest rate based on two inputs: how far inflation is from the central bank's target (usually 2%), and how far the economy is from full capacity — a concept economists call the "output gap."

The Taylor Rule (Simplified)

Theoretical Rate = Neutral Rate + 1.5 × (Inflation − Target) + 0.5 × Output Gap

Example:

  • Neutral rate: 2.5%
  • Current inflation: 3.5% (target: 2%)
  • Output gap: +1% (economy running above potential)

Taylor Rule rate = 2.5 + 1.5 × (3.5 − 2) + 0.5 × 1 = 5.25%

If the actual policy rate is 4.75%, it sits 50bp below where the Taylor Rule says it should be — a modestly accommodative stance.

The Output Gap: Okun's Law

The output gap measures whether the economy is running above or below its potential. One standard method for estimating it is Okun's Law, which links unemployment to economic output. When unemployment falls below its natural rate, the economy is likely running hot (positive output gap). When unemployment exceeds the natural rate, there is slack (negative output gap).

Central Bank-Specific Models

Each central bank has distinct characteristics, and the models are calibrated accordingly:

  • Federal Reserve: Standard Taylor Rule with Okun's Law. See Fed models page.
  • European Central Bank: Modified Taylor Rule accounting for eurozone heterogeneity. See ECB models page.
  • Bank of England: Adapted for UK-specific inflation dynamics. See BoE models page.

Full technical details are on the respective model pages.

Taylor Rule Framework

The generalized Taylor Rule specification:

$$i_t = r^* + \pi_t + \alpha(\pi_t - \pi^*) + \beta \cdot y_t$$

Where:

  • \(i_t\) = recommended policy rate
  • \(r^*\) = neutral real rate (r-star)
  • \(\pi_t\) = current inflation
  • \(\pi^*\) = inflation target
  • \(y_t\) = output gap
  • \(\alpha, \beta\) = policy response coefficients (canonical values: 1.5, 0.5)

Output Gap Estimation

Three methods are employed:

  1. Okun's Law: \(y_t = -\gamma (u_t - u^*)\) where \(\gamma \approx 2\)
  2. HP Filter: Trend-cycle decomposition of real GDP
  3. Production Function: Structural estimation based on capital, labor, and TFP

Central Bank-Specific Implementations

Detailed specifications are on each central bank's model page:

  • Fed: Balanced-approach rule, inertial Taylor Rule variants
  • ECB: Cross-country aggregation, HICP versus core inflation specifications
  • BoE: CPI-targeting adjustments, Brexit-era modifications

Individual model pages document estimation methodology, parameter calibration, and backtesting results.

Rate Gap Analysis & Policy Stance Assessment

Comparing actual rates to theoretical rates

The Rate Gap

Each central bank page includes a chart of the historical rate gap — the difference between the actual policy rate and the Taylor Rule's recommended rate.

Rate Gap = Actual Rate − Theoretical Rate

Interpretation:

  • Positive gap (e.g. +50bp): Actual rate above the Taylor Rule → Hawkish (restrictive policy)
  • Near zero (±25bp): Actual rate close to the Taylor Rule → Neutral
  • Negative gap (e.g. −50bp): Actual rate below the Taylor Rule → Dovish (accommodative policy)

Worked Example

Consider the ECB in mid-2023:

  • Actual deposit rate: 3.75%
  • Taylor Rule theoretical rate: 4.25%
  • Rate gap: 3.75 − 4.25 = −50bp

Interpretation: Despite a rapid hiking cycle through 2022–2023, ECB policy remained slightly accommodative relative to the Taylor Rule, suggesting scope for further tightening had inflation persisted.

Why This Matters

The rate gap offers a framework for assessing policy bias (whether the next move is more likely a hike or a cut), the reasonableness of market pricing, and whether policy may be too tight (risking recession) or too loose (risking persistent inflation). Combined with probability forecasts, it provides a more complete picture: what markets expect versus what fundamentals suggest.

Classification Methodology

Policy stance is classified via threshold-based rules:

$$\text{Gap}_t = i_t - \hat{i}_t$$ $$\text{Stance} = \begin{cases} \text{Hawkish} & \text{if Gap}_t > +25\text{bp} \\ \text{Neutral} & \text{if } |\text{Gap}_t| \leq 25\text{bp} \\ \text{Dovish} & \text{if Gap}_t < -25\text{bp} \end{cases}$$

Where \(i_t\) is the actual policy rate and \(\hat{i}_t\) is the Taylor Rule prescription. The ±25bp threshold reflects measurement uncertainty in the output gap and neutral rate estimates.

Historical Context

Rate gap charts provide useful historical perspective:

  • 2008–2015: Persistently negative gaps (dovish) during the zero lower bound period
  • 2016–2019: Gradual normalization, gaps approaching zero
  • 2020–2021: Large negative gaps (highly dovish) during the pandemic
  • 2022–2024: Rapid swing to positive gaps (hawkish) during the inflation fight

Limitations

Taylor Rule-based assessment has well-documented limitations:

  1. Neutral rate uncertainty: Estimates of r* range from 0.5% to 3%.
  2. Output gap measurement: Real-time and revised estimates often diverge materially.
  3. Specification sensitivity: Results vary with core versus headline inflation and alternative response coefficients.
  4. Financial stability: The Taylor Rule ignores asset prices and credit conditions.

Rate gaps are presented as one input to policy assessment, not as definitive judgments. Central banks weigh a broader set of indicators than any single rule captures.

Future Directions

Planned expansions and methodology enhancements

Planned Expansions

  • Bank of Canada: Under consideration, pending CORRA futures data availability.
  • Bank of Japan: Under consideration, pending TONA futures data availability.
  • Swiss National Bank: Under consideration, pending SARON futures data availability.

Methodology Enhancements Under Consideration

Several enhancements are in the research phase:

  • Adaptive spread forecasting: Dynamic regime-switching models for ESTR/SONIA spreads, calibrated to reserve levels and QE/QT paths. Preliminary backtests suggest a 3–5pp accuracy improvement during balance sheet transitions, though implementation complexity is significant.
  • Time-varying volatility: Scaling probability distributions by meeting proximity and market uncertainty measures such as the VIX and policy uncertainty indices.
  • Machine learning enhancements: Neural networks for spread regime prediction and improved output gap estimation.

The current methodology prioritizes simplicity and transparency over marginal accuracy gains from more complex models.

Feedback

This is an evolving project. Questions, corrections, and methodological suggestions are welcome — please get in touch.

Interactive Excel Calculator

An Excel tool for exploring the expanding-tree methodology

This Excel workbook implements the probability calculation methodology described above. Users can modify futures price inputs and observe how rate probabilities evolve across multiple policy meetings.

ECB Rate Probability Calculator

Excel workbook with binary tree calculations, visual probability tree, and automatic updates. No macros — pure formula-based calculations.

  • Matches Python implementation exactly
  • Distinguishes meeting vs. non-meeting months
  • Complete documentation included

Quick Start Guide

Getting Started in 3 Steps
  1. Download and open the Excel file.
  2. Go to the InputData sheet and update futures prices for all 8 months (including non-meeting months).
  3. View results in the Summary sheet — all calculations update automatically.

Workbook Structure

  • Config: Set the current ECB deposit rate and ESTR level.
  • InputData: Enter monthly ESTR futures prices (8 months).
  • Calculations: Price propagation with meeting/non-meeting distinction.
  • BinaryTree: Visual probability tree showing all paths.
  • Summary: Final probability distribution and bar chart.

Key feature: The calculator distinguishes between meeting months (when rates can change) and non-meeting months (when rates remain constant). This distinction is critical for accurate probability calculation.

References and Further Reading

Academic sources and data sources

Core Methodology Papers

  1. CME Group. (2023). Understanding the CME FedWatch Tool Methodology. Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Link
  2. Piazzesi, M., & Swanson, E. T. (2008). Futures prices as risk-adjusted forecasts of monetary policy. JFnal of Monetary Economics, 55(4), 677-691.
  3. Link
  4. Gürkaynak, R. S., Sack, B., & Swanson, E. (2005). The sensitivity of long-term interest rates to economic news: Evidence and implications for macroeconomic models. American Economic Review, 95(1), 425-436.
  5. Link
  6. Krueger, J. T., & Kuttner, K. N. (1996). The fed funds futures rate as a predictor of Federal Reserve policy. The Journal of Futures Markets, 16(8), 865-879.
  7. Link

Taylor Rule and Policy Assessment

  1. Taylor, J. B. (1993). Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, 195-214.
  2. Link
  3. Orphanides, A. (2003). Historical monetary policy analysis and the Taylor rule. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(5), 983-1022.
  4. Link
  5. Bernanke, B. S. (2010). Monetary policy and the housing bubble. Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association.
  6. Link

Central Bank Behavior and Forward Guidance

  1. Rudebusch, G. D. (2002). Term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary policy inertia. Journal of Monetary Economics, 49(6), 1161-1187.
  2. Link
  3. Coibion, O., & Gorodnichenko, Y. (2012). Why are target interest rate changes so persistent? American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 4(4), 126-162.
  4. Link

European Central Bank and ESTR

  1. Linzert, T., & Schmidt, S. (2008). What explains the spread between the Euro overnight rate and the ECB's policy rate? ECB Working Paper No. 983.
  2. Link
  3. Pérez-Quirós, G., & Rodríguez-Mendizábal, H. (2006). The daily market for funds in Europe: What has changed with the EMU? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38(1), 91-118.
  4. Link

Output Gap and Okun's Law

  1. Okun, A. M. (1962). Potential GNP: Its measurement and significance. Proceedings of the Business and Economics Statistics Section, American Statistical Association, 98-104.
  2. Ball, L., Leigh, D., & Loungani, P. (2017). Okun's Law: Fit at 50? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 49(7), 1413-1441.
  3. Link
Note About CME Data

CME FedWatch Tool and data are proprietary to CME Group. Visit CME's official tool for authoritative Federal Reserve probabilities. My work focuses on extending their methodology to other central banks.